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Abstract This paper re-considers the relevance of Peter Sedgwick’s Psychopolitics
(1982) for a politics of mental health. Psychopolitics offered an indictment of ‘anti-
psychiatry’ the failure of which, Sedgwick argued, lay in its deconstruction of the
category of ‘mental illness’, a gesture that resulted in a politics of nihilism. ‘The radical
who is only a radical nihilist’, Sedgwick observed, ‘is for all practical purposes the most
adamant of conservatives’. Sedgwick argued, rather, that the concept of ‘mental illness’
could be a truly critical concept if it was deployed ‘to make demands upon the health
service facilities of the society in which we live’. The paper contextualizes Psychopolitics
within the ‘crisis tendencies’ of its time, surveying the shifting welfare landscape of
the subsequent 25 years alongside Sedgwick’s continuing relevance. It considers the
dilemma that the discourse of ‘mental illness’ – Sedgwick’s critical concept – has fallen
out of favour with radical mental health movements yet remains paradigmatic within
psychiatry itself. Finally, the paper endorses a contemporary perspective that, while
necessarily updating Psychopolitics, remains nonetheless ‘Sedgwickian’.
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Introduction: Peter Sedgwick and Psychopolitics
Peter Sedgwick (1934–1983)1 was a Marxist, a trained psychologist and the
translator of the revolutionary Victor Serge (1963). Unlike most Marxists,
Sedgwick took a personal and political interest in the fields of psychiatry and
mental health, bringing his ‘great wit, compassion and political precision’
(Widgery, 1991) to bear on a historically neglected field: the welfare of the
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‘mentally ill’. Like the contributions of second-wave feminism (for example,
Rowbotham et al, 1980), Sedgwick understood any human experience as
combining the personal and the political and carried over that perspective into
his analysis of psychiatry. He took seriously the value of political theory
for understanding this field, while nevertheless insisting upon a humanistic
appreciation of mental distress. Using his book Psychopolitics (1982) as the stem
text, this paper re-evaluates Sedgwick’s contribution and re-considers the im-
plications of his critique for a contemporary politics of mental health.
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section historicizes
Psychopolitics within the British context of the 1980s. Jurgen Habermas’s notion
of ‘crisis tendencies’ (1976) is deployed to specify Sedgwick’s critique in terms
of, respectively, three ‘crises’: (i) a crisis of British welfarism; (ii) a crisis of Left-
wing politics; and (iii) a crisis of psychiatric legitimacy. This critique, which is
outlined in the subsequent section, is posited as transecting these crises. Given
that Sedgwick’s work is historically specified, the penultimate section explores
the value of his critique in the contemporary context. We argue that, while in
certain respects history has problematized this critique – and we specify that
problematization – Sedgwick’s approach to questions of political strategy re-
tains its value today. The final section argues the case for a politics of mental
health which, while updating Psychopolitics, remains nonetheless ‘Sedgwickian’
(Spandler, 2007).
Historicizing Psychopolitics
Sedgwick (1955) first deployed the term ‘psychopolitics’ in the 1950s when
criticizing the tendency to explain away political activism via individual psy-
chology, drawing attention to the ways in which communist sympathizers had
been pathologized in the West. Later, his critical focus turned to the con-
servative undercurrents of the radical theorists associated with 1960s ‘anti-
psychiatry’ (for example, Sedgwick, 1972, 1973, 1975). Psychopolitics sums up
this analysis. The historical specificity of the book is central to its understanding
so that any attempt to re-consider it requires its contextualization as the poli-
tical critique it was doubtless intended to be. Viewed in this way, Psychopolitics
transects three inter-woven axes, each axis signifying certain ‘crisis tendencies’
of his time (see Habermas, 1976).
Axis no. 1 – Signifying a British context that had witnessed the end of the
‘long boom’ of post-war affluence predicated upon the emergence of the welfare
state (see Coates, 1991) and the rise of a ‘New Right’, embodied in the figure
of Margaret Thatcher, which sought to dismantle that state while simulta-
neously exposing it to the ‘chill winds of market forces’ (see Gamble, 1990). The
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subsequent Crisis of Welfarism heralded the marketization of welfare (see Leys,
2001).
Axis no. 2 – Signifying a context of Left-wing activism, which had become
fractured with the rise of the ‘New Right’ and the calling into question by social
movements of a ‘class-first’ policy insensitive to emerging identity-claims (see
Hall, 1996). To fully situate Psychopolitics within debates on the Left, it is
necessary to note that it appeared within a time span which also included Eric
Hobsbawm’s (1978) ‘The forward march of Labour halted’, Stuart Hall’s (1979)
‘The great moving right show’, Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary
Wainwright’s (1980) Beyond the Fragments, and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe’s (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).
Sedgwick, then, was intervening upon similar terrain and responding to
particular problematics within the organized Left of his day. If Axis no. 1
signifies a crisis in British welfarism, Axis no. 2 signifies a Crisis of the Left.
Axis no. 3 – Signifying the field ofmental health politics and the emergence of
social movements organizing around themes of human distress. Sedgwick was
fully au fait with both the counter-cultural phenomenon of ‘anti-psychiatry’
associated with the figure of R.D. Laing (for example, 1967) and the emerging
‘patient’s movement’ represented by such groups as the Mental Patient’s Union
(see Crossley, 2006a; Spandler, 2006). Such developments ensured that
psychiatric power – hidden for so long behind the ‘gigantic water-tower’ of the
Asylum age (see Bell and Lindley (eds.), 2005) – was becoming, in an era of
‘community care’, both a contested and visible ‘field’ (Crossley, 2006a, b). Such
contestation signifies what may be called the Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation.
The notion of ‘crisis tendencies’ refers to that dynamic within advanced
capitalism (Habermas, 1976, pp. 33–94) for ‘system crises’ to undergo a dis-
placement from their economic ‘base’ (Marx, 1968, p. 182) to one situated at
the interface of the state and civil society. Such ‘social crises’, in contrast to
‘system crises’, do not threaten the capitalist system as such, but are, rather,
crises at the level of social integration. Legitimation crises, as a sub-species of
social crises, arise insofar as the democratic outputs of the state fail to meet the
democratic demands of civil society, demands which, to a large extent, welfare
state intervention triggered in the first place (Offe, 1984). In an important sense,
then, a legitimation crisis is a crisis of a democratic polity, a calling into
question of its democratic status. As Crossley (2005, pp. 40–50) points out,
apropos Habermas’s later amendments (1981), the rise of new social move-
ments, including mental health movements, are stimulants of legitimation cri-
ses to the extent that, in the case considered here, movement-articulated
demands are precisely those demands for democratic outputs from
psychiatry, considered as a welfare state apparatus, which psychiatry is
frequently unable to meet.
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In this respect, Sedgwick’s analysis is exemplary. Not only is he sensitive to
these crisis tendencies at the interface of the state and civil society (Axis no. 1),
he is also able to specify these tendencies both for the mental health field (Axis
no. 3) and for Left-wing activism within it (Axis no. 2) while never losing sight
of the wider context beyond. Accordingly, in Psychopolitics these axes inter-
weave in the following way. Axis no. 3 – the field of political action ‘in and
against’ psychiatry (‘psychopolitics’) – is always the foregrounded axis so that
the elucidation of a distinct ‘psychopolitics’ constitutes the books most lasting
achievement. On the other hand, the explication of Axes 1 and 2 is absolutely
necessary to the critique insofar as it contextualizes the significance of this
specific ‘field of contention’. It is only within the overall context of the ‘great
moving right show’ and the urgent tasks faced by the organized Left in an era of
both Right-wing resurgence and proliferating identity-claims, that the import
of Sedgwick’s analysis fully swings into view. We will keep these axes of
contextualization always in view as we turn, in the next section, to the details of
Sedgwick’s critique.
Central Critique of Psychopolitics
Psychopolitics may be divided into three parts. First, Sedgwick advances a de-
finition of mental illness, which refuses to erect a strict dualism between mental
and physical health. He thus adopts a unitary conception of illness beneath
which is subsumed both physical and mental aspects. This move proves deci-
sive because, in the second part of the book, he evaluates a number of radical
critics of psychiatry (the ‘anti-psychiatrists’) and finds them guilty of insin-
uating into psychiatric debates a nihilistic form of critique, which he calls
‘psycho-medical dualism’ (1982, pp. 43–65). These ‘ideological celebrities’,
as Sedgwick dubs them (1982, p. 3), are Erving Goffman (1961), R.D. Laing
(1967), Michel Foucault (2006) and Thomas Szasz (1974). Having despatched
these critics in turn, Sedgwick finally considers the current state of ‘psycho-
politics’ itself along with its future prospects.
In order to grasp the value of Sedgwick’s critique, we must not misconstrue
his philosophical discourse; specifically, his rejection of psycho-medical dualism
in favour of the unitary conception of illness noted above. Sedgwick is not
offering a philosophy of psychiatry here in the analytical vein (for example,
Fulford et al, 2003). Rather, operating within a Marxist tradition of social
critique (Marx, 1969), Sedgwick offers a distinctively political epistemology
(Lecourt, 1975) of the concept of ‘illness’. The minutiae of this argument need
not detain us, but the upshot must. For, contra Laing, Goffman et al, Sedgwick
rejects the mind–body duality upon which their ‘psycho-medical dualism’
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rests. Briefly, psycho-medical dualism posits medicine as a scientific realm of
‘fact’, which takes as its referent the materiality of the body, and to this it
contraposes psychiatry as a realm of ‘value’, which, rather, takes as its referent
the uniqueness of the human mind. According to this perspective, there is a
world of difference between a value-neutral diagnosis such as ‘diabetes’ and a
value-laden one such as ‘schizophrenia’. The former is a scientific classification;
the latter is deviancy labelled by power.
Sedgwick works in the opposite conceptual direction to ‘anti-psychiatry’;
he takes its basic motif – that of ‘value-laden-ness’ – and drives it into
the heart of medicine itself. Hence, for Sedgwick, all illness ‘is essentially
deviancy’ (1982, p. 32, original emphasis) and, therefore, equally laden with
value:
[q]uite correctly, the anti-psychiatrists have pointed out that psychopatho-
logical categories refer to value judgements and that mental illness is
deviancy. On the other hand, the anti-psychiatric critics themselves are
wrong when they imagine physical medicine to be essentially different in its
logic from psychiatry y mental illnesses can be conceptualized within the
disease framework just as easily as physical maladies.
(ibid., p. 38, emphasis added)
Sedgwick’s conception is subtle and needs to be carefully rendered. In
stressing the value-laden-ness of medicine, it is not his intention to disregard
its scientific credentials. At the same time, in subsuming a diagnosis of
‘schizophrenia’ within the illness framework, neither is he endorsing
psychiatry’s epistemological claims. Sedgwick is pro-medicine precisely
to the extent that he envisages a radically socialized medicine applicable
equally to physical and mental health. Such examples of socialized medicine
include, ‘[t]he insertion of windows into working-class houses’ (ibid., p. 39)
and ‘the provision of a pure water supply and an efficient sewage disposal’
(ibid.).
This is why Sedgwick’s unitary conception of illness is, before anything else,
a political epistemology and, as such, inextricably connected to the conditions
of possibility for future political work. Thus, for Sedgwick, the productiveness
of the concept of ‘illness’ resides in the prospect of ‘politicizing medical goals’
(ibid., 40):
I am arguing that without the concept of illness – including that of mental
illness y we shall be unable to make demands upon the health service
facilities of the society in which we live. (ibid., original emphasis)
It is this injunction – that a political epistemology should lead to ‘demands’ –
that moves Sedgwick to a decisive indictment of the anti-psychiatrists. For
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despite their brilliant deconstructions of ‘schizophrenia’ et al, they are bereft of
any productive demands of their own:
[t]he sociological critics of the mental illness concept are y deeply cynical
y and the cynic cannot really be a critic; the radical who is only a radical
nihilisty is for most practical purposes the most adamant of conservatives.
(ibid., p. 42)
In relation to the axes of contextualization sketched out above, Sedgwick’s
analysis is exemplary because, not only does he identify the limitations of ‘anti-
psychiatry’, but also he is critical of the organized Left’s long-standing neglect
of the mental health field. Despite his own political commitments, he refused to
ignore reactionary tendencies among workers and health trade unions in rela-
tion to mental health:
[t]he mental-health services now comprise a constellation of partial staff
interests, whose trade-union representation runs along the lines of this
alienated institutional ordery In this era of psychiatric monetarismy the
mental health worker is forced into a defensive y stance because of a fear
that a more adventurous approach will further worsen his or her conditions.
(ibid., pp. 234–235)
Although Sedgwick recognized the importance of the economic ‘base’ for
psychiatric provision ‘via the operations of general systems of public assistance’
(1982, p. 203), he did not automatically assume that the resolution of the Crisis
of Psychiatric Legitimation would be effected by ‘economistic’ means – say, by a
‘workerist’ defence of ‘jobs and conditions’ (1982, p. 230). At the same time,
Sedgwick was equally critical of the ‘considerable crudity’ with which issues of
mental health had been politicized by those sections of the Left, which some-
times supported ‘anti-psychiatry’ along with its central motifs. Such approaches
tended to ‘romanticize’ madness, reifying the dissident mental patient as a
substitute revolutionary force. Always sensitive to its personal and political
aspects, Sedgwick fretted over the ‘extraordinary burden’ such expectations
placed upon the mentally ill: they were to be either (i) inserted epipheno-
menally into an already given class ideology in which the specific content
of their distress was forever elided; or else (ii) co-opted as ‘a cadre in the
assemblage of counter-forces y in antagonism to our y oppressive society’
(ibid., pp. 237–238).
Notwithstanding these reservations, Sedgwick remained adamant that the
field of mental health must be a site of activity for the organized Left. He was
pessimistic about the prospects of mental health movements acting alone; their
defensive assertion of ‘negative rights’ (ibid., pp. 218–221) amounted to nothing
more, he argued, than ‘the ritualistic evasion of the serious questions of
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long-term psychiatric care’ (ibid, p. 241). Yet he bemoaned the fact that the task
of integrating cross-sectional demands ‘has never been undertaken by the
organized left, despite its pretension to possess a reasoned and principled
overview of the social order’ (ibid., p. 236).
With this aim in view, Sedgwick analysed the processes and paradoxes of
making ‘psychopolitical’ demands. He endorsed the need for active social
movements able to politically transect the axes of contextualization sketched
out above; that is to say, to build cross-sectional (ibid., p. 243) alliances with
patients, carers, professionals and the organized Left in order to pursue collective
welfare demands. Such cross-sectional alliances meant, in the first instance,
‘working within the publicly funded system of heath and social-welfare provision’
(ibid., pp. 244–255, original emphasis). Yet he was also acutely aware of the:
dilemma of all innovators for whom the present state-run facilities offer little
in the way of a model, and even less in the way of inspiration, is that of
engineering a voluntary alternative model of care which will not abdicate
from the broader responsibility of posing more general and long-term
demands. (ibid., p. 245, original emphasis)
Thus, he ended Psychopolitics with some prefigurative examples of ‘mutual
aid’, drawing upon the anarchist tradition (for example, Kropotkin, 1908) to
insist upon the ‘countervailing power of voluntary social initiative, outside the
bureaucratic compass of the state’ (Sedgwick, 1982, p. 252), practices which
were ‘voluntarily conceived, yet, materially implemented’ (ibid., p. 256). Psy-
chopolitical struggle, finally, is, for Sedgwick, Janus-faced; for it looks both
towards reclaiming the state (see Wainwright, 2003), in the guise of ‘publicly
funded y social-welfare provision’ and towards emancipatory experiments
emanating primarily from the ‘voluntary’ sector. With characteristic compre-
hensiveness, Sedgwick observed that we need both of these sectors precisely
because they answer to different questions: the ‘base’ question of political
economy (that is, resource allocation) as well as ‘widery questions of medical
politics’ (ibid., p. 194). These ‘wider questions’ do not concern the quantitative
question solely (resource allocation), but also the qualitative question of ‘what
kind’ of psychiatric services we need (ibid., p. 195). For Sedgwick, it was
precisely responding to this latter question that necessitates both reclaiming the
state and emancipatory experimentation.
‘Psychopolitics’ Today
We have grasped the specificity of Psychopolitics, then, via its central critique
and the axes of contextualization outlined above. Yet, an obvious question
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remains. How should we survey the field of ‘psychopolitics’ today? The inter-
vening 25 years have seen profound global and national transformations as well
as changes in the mental health field – transformations that Sedgwick, perhaps,
could not have foreseen. However, far from being resolved, the ‘crisis tenden-
cies’ that contextualized Sedgwick’s original intervention, remain extant today.
This is not the same as saying that they have just remained the same. We stress
the historicity of crisis tendencies rather than their structural inertia. As such,
we would analyse these changes in the following way.
Axis no. 1: Re: Crisis of British welfarism
We have witnessed a consolidation of neo-liberal hegemony with regard to the
Crisis of Welfare. In the British context, an escalation of ‘Thatcherism’ in the
form of a ‘market-driven politics’ (see Leys, 2001) has penetrated what had
hitherto been bureaucracies (for example, the NHS) and the endorsement by
New Labour post-1997 of that entrepreneurial form of governance described as
the ‘new public management’ (see Du Gay, 1996). We view ‘Blair/Brownism’ as
an escalation of ‘Thatcherism’ rather than a qualitative ‘break’. At the same
time a ‘mixed economy’ of care has become the common-sense of govern-
mentality (see Burchell et al, 1991) in the wake of the economic constraints
imposed on the public sector by, for example, the NHS & Community Care Act
(1990). This has led to a proliferation of ‘3rd sector’ (voluntary) service
provision, of a type alluded to in favourable terms by Sedgwick (1982,
pp. 248–249), although the specific transformations of that sector are not of the
type he may have foreseen.
Axis no. 2: Re: Crisis of the Left
We have witnessed a deepening of the Crisis of the Left with regard, not only to
internal sectarianism, but also to a failure to re-orient political strategy in an
‘age of movements and networks’.2 Far from ‘dying the death’, Left-wing acti-
vism in Britain has persisted, with predictable vicissitudes, alongside a pro-
liferation of ‘even newer’ social movements for example, anti-globalization
networks and ‘eco-politics’ (Crossley, 2003) which make both distributive and
identity-claims. However, various attempts at ‘unifying’ the Left in Britain (for
example, through, first, the ‘Socialist Alliance’, then the ‘Respect’ coalition)
have not been sustained and it remains unclear whether such organizations
interact with social movements in a politically meaningful way.3 With some
notable exceptions (for example, SHA, 1989), the Left have, by and large, failed
to engage with the broader politics of mental health of which Sedgwick was so
acutely aware, when, for example, campaigning in defence of jobs and services
and against privatization and ‘cuts’ (Coleman, 1998; McKeown, 2008; Mckeown
et al, 2008). Neither the ‘anti-psychiatric’ critics, nor the organized Left, it
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seems, have adequately responded to Sedgwick’s critique, although psychiatry
continues to experience its Crisis of Legitimation.
Axis no. 3: Re: Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation
In response to that crisis, psychiatry has, at one and the same time, expanded
the ‘illness’ category into hitherto undiscovered fields of human experience
while simultaneously bolstering its claims to scientificity via a thoroughgoing
biologism and its claims to legitimacy via the extension of lawful coercion.
These strategies have encountered resistance.
Indeed, the mental health field has witnessed an explosion of such resistance
with a proliferation of networked, but rarely hierarchically co-ordinated, move-
ments and groups. Some of the most significant of these, for the British
experience, have been Survivors Speak Out (Campbell, 1989), The Hearing
Voices Network (James, 2001), the National Self-Harm Network (Pembroke,
1995) and Mad Pride (Curtis et al, 2000). The increasing heterogeneity of user
groups has resulted in recent attempts to unify the ‘user voice’ through a
national forum, a move which has provoked controversy regarding issues of
democratic representation and the dangers of co-optation (Pilgrim, 2005).
These developments have not borne out Sedgwick’s pessimistic views about:
(i) the possibility of autonomous political action by service users; nor (ii) that a
nihilistic conservatism inevitably follows adoption of ‘anti-psychiatric’ motifs;
nor (iii) that patients groups would necessarily adopt a purely defensive,
‘negative-rights’ based agenda, which is always against psychiatric ‘abuses’ but
never for psychiatric ‘uses’ (Sedgwick, 1982, pp. 218–221). On the contrary,
although such movements have been highly autonomous, they have been
simultaneously the product of alliances between workers, service users and
political activists (notably feminists). Moreover, these have led to the ‘devel-
opment of new programmes, demands and services’ from service users and
workers alike, ‘demands’ which Sedgwick neither realized nor anticipated
(Sedgwick, 1982, p. 222). For example, the politicization of issues such as ‘self-
harm’ and ‘hearing voices’ – which psychiatry traditionally subsumes beneath
‘illness’ categories – has resulted in a number of self-help strategies and
practices such as ‘harm minimization’ (Cresswell, 2005a, b) and ‘coping with
voices’ (Blackman, 2007; Romme and Escher, 1993) pursued via non-medical,
consensual means. Such developments have also challenged Sedgwick’s
insistence that a ‘unitary conception of illness’ is the necessary precursor to
politicization of the mental health field.
In fact, the organizations noted above have explicitly rejected the notion of
‘illness’; and have sought instead to locate the specificity of experience, such as
hearing voices or self harm, deploying alternative concepts and frameworks
such as ‘mental distress’ (Campbell, 1989; Plumb, 1999) or even ‘madness’
Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health
137r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 7, 2, 129–147
(Curtis et al, 2000). The mobilization of such groups has revolved around the
discursive ensemble ‘trauma/abuse/distress’ rather than the Sedgwickian
ensemble ‘illness/disease’ (see Cresswell, 2005a, b). Such frameworks attest to
the importance of personal histories of trauma and abuse (Herman, 1994), as
well as iatrogenic degradations experienced within the mental health system
itself (see Breggin, 2008).
However, the ‘unitary concept of illness’ has persisted in a powerful quarter
of the mental health field. For it has been liberal campaigners as well as, of
course, psychiatry itself, that continue to deploy the ‘illness’ category as part of
a strategy of ‘psychiatric expansionism’ (Castel et al, 1979), especially in so-
called ‘anti-stigma’ campaigns (see Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005). These are often
underpinned by the Sedgwick-sounding mantra: ‘mental illness is an illness like
any other’. Such campaigns seek to bolster the legitimacy of a reductive
biological approach within psychiatry, alienating in the process many user
movements and groups while not necessarily fulfilling their anti-discriminatory
aims (see Read et al, 2006).
Although Sedgwick was right not to erect a crude dualism between the
mental and physical per se, the concept of ‘illness’ is problematic, and this is not
just a deconstructivist obsession with language. Moreover, contra Sedgwick,
Cresswell (2008) has argued that Thomas Szasz’s own brand of ‘psycho-
medical dualism’ – despite the limitations of Szasz’s own Right-wing ideology
which Sedgwick critiqued (1982, pp. 149–184) – is defensible for a number
of reasons, independent of that critique. Psychiatry and medicine must be
distinguished at the level of material practices and these practices consist of
epistemological (for example, scientific), ethical (for example, coercion and
consent) and technological (for example, diagnosis and treatment) aspects.
Regarded in this sense, psychiatry and medicine do not exist on a par in quite
the way that Sedgwick’s ‘unitary concept of illness’ would have us believe.
Unlike medicine, for example, where treatment is rarely imposed, psychiatric
technology is bound up, like a ‘conjoined twin’ (Szasz, 2004, p. 53), with
mental health laws that enable and enforce coercion. This fact strikes to the
heart of the Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation but is somewhat elided in
Sedgwick. Let us be clear on this point. It is not the deployment of the category
of ‘illness’ that necessarily leads to coercion – it does not in medicine – rather,
the point to be emphasized is that psychiatric coercion is both legitimized by the
state while being notoriously prone to abuses (see Johnstone, 2000).
Indeed, it is precisely opposition to the extension of coercive powers that has
unified various organizations within the mental health field. Recent years have
witnessed an attempt by New Labour to render it lawful for certain categories of
‘patient’ to be coercively treated in the community – hitherto, an unprecedented
step in English law (Szmukler, 2004; Cresswell, 2005c). Such proposals,
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embedded in new mental health legislation in England and Wales (Mental
Health Act, 2007), resulted in sustained opposition from a heterogeneous
alliance of ‘3rd sector’ advocacy organizations (for example, MIND), profes-
sional collectives (for example, the Royal College of Psychiatrists) and service
user groups (for example, the United Kingdom Advocacy Network) combining
together beneath the rubric of the Mental Health Alliance.4 Concerns about
coercion also led to the formation of the Critical Psychiatry Network in 1999, a
group of dissident psychiatrists who argue that psychiatry has failed to meet the
challenges posed by its critics and thus remains deeply mired in its Crisis of
Legitimation (Bracken and Thomas, 2005; Double, 2006).
To open up possibilities for productive transformation transecting these axes,
we argue for an approach that, while necessarily updating Psychopolitics,
remains nonetheless Sedgwickian. The final section specifies the meaning of
this by analysing the conditions of possibility for a new Psychopolitics.
For a New ‘Psychopolitics’
Although we relate the following conditions to each of the three axes out-
lined above, any single intervention in one axis is intended to possess a
universalizing potential; in other words, to aspire to a ‘cross-sectional’ impact.
As should become evident, such potentiality makes it truly Sedgwickian.
Strategic demands
In the context of a Crisis of Welfarism and, more specifically, continuing attacks
on collective provision, a progressive psychopolitics must continue to make
concrete welfare demands. For example, in the current policy context, one
that promotes ‘individual responsibility’ rather than ‘socialized provision’, a
Sedgwickian approach would continue to emphasize the necessity of public
assistance for people experiencing mental distress.
The development of mental health politics post-Sedgwick has often focused
attention on activism ‘outside the bureaucratic compass of the state’ (Sedgwick,
1982, p. 252), for example, through the development of local ‘3rd sector’
self-help organizations. Notwithstanding the importance of these, we want to
emphasize that it is the public sector that constitutes a privileged point of
political action. We posit the public sector in this way not out of any partiality
or preference but out of the realization that disputes in that sector possess
maximum potential for universalizing the content of collective welfare
demands. We deploy the notion of ‘welfare demands’ (see Laclau, 2005) to
signify both the importance of demands made in the direction of the state
(centrally and locally) and demands which crystallize into disputes within the
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public sector itself (strikes, fights against privatization and so on) when, for
example, such ‘demands’ are rejected (See Barker, 2008). Such disputes, which
may mobilize a relatively ‘critical mass’, possess the widest possible potential
for alliance-formation – they ‘suck’ into the public sector, centripetally as it
were, social movements, carers groups, trade unions, the Left and so on – and,
hence, permit strategic welfare demands to be made which possess the widest
possible political force.
It follows from this that we must take seriously the defence of the core
institutions of welfare: the NHS and local authority provision. This requires an
active workforce committed to a radical psychopolitics, the importance of trade
union mobilization within it and an organized Left armed with a ‘reasoned and
principled overview of the social order’ (Sedgwick, 1982, p. 236). However, a
progressive psychopolitics also needs to reconstitute its understanding of what
we mean by ‘the public sector’, ‘the 3rd sector’ and, increasingly, the imbrica-
tion of the two. In an era of ‘mixed economies’, the 3rd sector is not the
undiluted sphere of mutual aid that Sedgwick envisaged. But neither is it just a
way for the state to ‘marketize’ the public sector through threats of ‘competitive
tendering’. Indeed, via strategies of governmentality, 3rd sector organizations
are increasingly incorporated into the public sector – through complex funding
dependencies, for instance – a move which makes them both newly constitutive
of welfare demands and less likely to pioneer those emancipatory practices of
which Sedgwick so rightly approved. On the positive side, the independence
provided by the 3rd sector has enabled a number of women’s organizations,
black and minority ethic groups and radical disability groups to mount specific
challenges to psychiatric legitimacy (see Sisters of the Yam, 2004; Women at the
Margins, 2004).
Thus, a Sedgwickian approach must defend both collective welfare provision
and open up spaces of innovation and contestation ‘outside the bureaucratic
compass of the state’ (Spandler, 2004). Although such a plea may sound either
‘obvious’ and/or paradoxical, we would argue that it is precisely a lack of
‘cross-sectionality’ in this respect that holds back a progressive psychopolitics
today. It is clear that mental health movements cannot fight such battles
alone. That Sedgwickian point has been re-emphasized recently by Hilary
Wainwright:
[w]e cannot point to ‘social movements’ to get us out of a tight spot. It should
be clear by now that movements come and go and cannot be evoked as some
self-evident answer to the problem of creating effective agencies of social
change.5
Therefore, the capacity to ‘make demands’ is predicated upon the develop-
ment of specific cross-sectional alliances – to which point we now turn.
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Organization and alliance
In the context of the Crisis of the Left a progressive psychopolitics requires us to
consider the forms of political organization, which will foster the development
of active and productive alliance. There is no point in underestimating
the paradoxes that underlie this process. Mental health movements are con-
stitutively heterogeneous and although this tendency was already apparent
when Sedgwick penned Psychopolitics, it has increased exponentially with the
‘quantum leap’ of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) since
the mid-1990s (see Castells, 2000, p. 171). There has, thus, emerged a plethora
of small social movement organizations which, nevertheless, because of ICT,
possess a national, even a globalized, ‘sweep’.6 Not only is this sort of ‘cyber-
activism’ here to stay (see Papacharissi, 2002), we would suggest that it offers
psychopolitics the ‘Techno-Political Tools’ necessary for the mobilization and
maintenance of cross-sectional alliances (Fuster and Morrell, 2007).
However, such heterogeneity is problematic for the Left in that their dispersed
constitution makes mental health movements difficult to liaise with and,
sometimes, even to locate. There is no one great mental health movement and
no charismatic ‘leader’ that we could take you to. Indeed, we would say, along
with Laclau (2005), that heterogeneity is constitutive of the political field under
conditions of advanced capitalism and that this has to be accepted as a political
point of departure.
A number of consequences attend heterogeneity. Cross-sectional alliances, it
has to be noted, are not the result of an immaculate conception; neither can
they be conjured into existence at a point of political rupture – for instance, in a
moment of management victimization or a public sector strike. Cross-sectional
alliances are founded upon the mobilization of pre-existing communicational
networks, painstakingly built, and they have to be always already present
at the point of political rupture if that mobilization is to constitute a case of
transformative power (Freeman, 1999).
Some of the most productive cross-sectional alliances in the field of mental
health have emerged in precisely this painstaking way – from the formation of:
(i) the Mental Patients Union in 1973 based upon networks of service users,
radical professionals and the activist Left; (ii) Survivors Speak Out in the 1980s
based around networks of ‘psychiatric survivors’, radical professionals and 3rd
sector groups (for example, MIND); (iii) the ‘self-harm survivors’ based upon
the confluence of Bristol-based feminist activism (see Wilton, 1995) and psy-
chiatric survivors (see Campbell, 1989/90); and (iv) the Residential workers
strikes and campaigns against ‘cuts’ in Sheffield of the 1990s based around
networks of service user groups and a strong trade union (NALGO) in which
the organized Left was both a significant force and able to mobilize nationally
(see Harrison, 1992).
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The difficulty of constituting cross-sectional alliances, therefore, amounts to a
problem of political strategy. For alliance-formation is precisely the task of
constituting a ‘logic of equivalence’ between heterogeneous political agents
(trade unions, Left activists, feminists, ‘survivors’, professional groups), a logic
that is perpetually subverted by the ‘logic of difference’ which gives rise to their
differential politicized identities in the first place (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985;
Laclau (ed.), 1994; see also Brown, 1995). In the final section of Psychopolitics,
Sedgwick anticipated this dialectic of ‘equivalence’ and ‘difference’ alongside
its prospects and threats. In being realistic enough about ‘difference’ he,
nevertheless, placed his hopes in ‘equivalence’. We choose to do the same.
Conceptual resources and ethical commitments
Finally, if a progressive psychopolitics requires us to make collective ‘welfare
demands’, it also requires a political epistemology worthy of the task. A Sedg-
wickian epistemology today must attend to the contemporary paradoxes of the
mental health field. In other words, any ‘demands’ and ‘alliances’ must attend
to the specificities of the mental health field plus the conditions of possibility for
future political work.
This is precisely what Sedgwick grasped when he reached for the unitary
conception of illness noted above. We would not want to be misunderstood on
this point, despite our valuation of Sedgwick’s critique. We would repeat our
problematization like this. Being ‘Sedgwickian’, ultimately, means making
‘psychopolitical demands’. ‘Illness’ may do that job, has done that job, could do
that job. But it is not the only way, especially if its deployment alienates those
individuals and organizations required for cross-sectional alliances to form
(McKeown, 2008). Deploying ‘illness’ as an epistemological point of departure
obscures the potential to radicalize how we view human distress, precisely
because it makes it difficult to challenge psychiatry’s claims to legitimacy; that
is to say, it makes it difficult to problematize how psychiatry constructs and
colonizes human distress in the first place (see Parker et al, 1995). Further, the
concept of ‘illness’ now exists within, and is legitimized by, a bio-medical
framework which is increasingly contested. The new discursive ensemble that
has arisen as paradigmatic of this contestation – trauma/abuse/distress – may
also ‘do the job’. It is not our intention, however, to substitute a teleology
of ‘illness’ (‘the future belongs to illness’ as Sedgwick predicted (1982,
p. 39)), to a teleology of, say, ‘trauma’ (‘the future belongs to trauma’). No such
category universalizes itself to such an extent that it does not provoke paradoxes
all of its own (see Furedi, 2003; also Skeggs, 1997, pp. 166–167).
Rather than erect a duality between ‘illness’ and ‘trauma’, we argue that a
political epistemology must first be historicized. That is to say, it must transform
its conceptual structure in response to the actual ‘experience’ of history; in
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response to the ‘working through’ of those very crisis tendencies noted above.
Shorn of the sheen of scientificity, we are suggesting a politically salient version
of Gaston Bachelard’s (2002) notion of ‘radical reflexivity’ in the process of
scientific concept-formation:
[W]e musty deform our initial concepts, examine these concepts condition
of application, and above all incorporate a concept’s conditions of application
into the very meaning of the concept. (ibid., p. 69, original emphasis)
Analytic precision is necessary here. By ‘deform the concept’, Bachelard does
not mean, ‘render it misshapen’. He means ‘to break down and reconfigure’ it.
For Bachelard, the scientist’s ‘radical reflexivity’ is nothing less than an ethical
stance – whose ‘duty’ is predicated upon a commitment to science’s episte-
mological norms. From a psychopolitical perspective we would say that
radical reflexivity is a politico-ethical stance (see Agamben, 1999, pp. 11–14) –
where a progressive duty is predicated upon a commitment to the radically
socialized psychopolitics that we have outlined above.
Such a politico-ethical commitment constitutes Sedgwick’s finest achievement.
It retains its value today. Just as he de-formed the nihilistic conceptions of
‘anti-psychiatry’ via his ‘unitary conception of illness’, so he simultaneously
de-formed the figure of the ‘mentally ill’ as it appeared stereotypically both in the
passive imaginary of the organized Left, and as the romanticized revolutionary
subject of ‘anti-psychiatry’. Although we may not agree with all of Sedgwick’s
critique, we do aspire to be as reflexive. Radical reflexivity, it turns out, is sy-
nonymous with Sedgwickian. Psychopolitics provides both a crucial resource for
such a critique and a positive framework for future political work.
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Notes
1 An internet archive devoted to the Sedgwick’s life and work can be found at http://
www.petersedgwick.org/, accessed 18 July 2008.
2 See ‘Any Respect Left’ by H. Wainwright, http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article689.html,
accessed 11 March 2008.
3 Such questions are addressed in an interesting way in the Transnational Institutes Networked
Politics, available at http://www.tni.org/detail_pub.phtml?know_id=39, accessed 7 March
2008 edited by Hilary Wainwright et al.
4 For more details see http://www.mentalhealthalliance.org.uk/aboutus/index.html_, accessed
5 March 2008.
5 See ‘Rethinking Political Parties’ on the Red Pepper website http://www.redpepper.org.uk/
article1017.html?var_recherche=rethinking%20political%20parties, accessed 11 March 2008.
6 To name just a selection, organizing around the issue of ‘Self-Harm’: ‘Self-Harm Alliance’,
http://beehive.thisisessex.co.uk/default.asp?WCI=SiteHome&ID=5423, accessed 18 April
2006; ‘Equilibrium’, http://www.selfharmony.co.uk/, accessed 18 April 2006; ‘Self-Injury &
Related Issues (SIARI)’, http://www.siari.co.uk/, accessed 17 April 2006; ‘Lifesigns (Self-injury
Guidance and Network Support)’, http://www.selfharm.org/index.html, accessed 17 April
2006.
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